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The “first wave” of donor sponsored anti-corruption programmes usefully focused on 
elaborating recommendations for parliamentarians or tried to train them (develop human 
capital) in anti-corruption. Now it time for these programmes to take into account 
parliamentarian incentives to adopt these recommendations and/or use this “knowledge.” 
This paper will discuss these incentives and the ways these programmes should and can 
help build political capital by managing voter demands, political competition, patronage, 
and enforcement. The paper also reviews some basic theories from formal political 
economy which may be of interest to practitioners interested in bridging the theory-
practice gap.  
 
 
This is a pre-print of an article submitted and accepted for publication by the 
Journal of Legislative Studies [2006] [copyright Taylor & Francis]; Journal Title is 
available online at: http://journalsonline.tandf.co.uk/    2
The Role of Incentive Design in Parliamentarian Anti-Corruption Programmes 




Since the mid-1990s, a number of organisations have been engaged in teaching 
parliamentarians around the world how to fight corruption and support the rule of law. In 
Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union, parliamentarians are admonished to 
exercise greater oversight over executive agencies. Parliamentarians are also encouraged 
to establish "networks" across their countries and across the globe or go on study tours 
which may or may not have large long-term impacts.
1 While the lack of staff, budgetary 
resources, and conflicting priorities in parliament are discussed, the underlying 
assumption of such training is that by building sufficient "human capital" (knowledge and 
skills), parliamentarians can overcome their institutionally-derived obstacles which 
prevent them fulfilling their parliamentary obligations and become more effective 
bulwarks against executive administrative corruption.   
 
Yet, human capital is a small component of a larger problem tied to 
parliamentarian incentives. Anti-corruption programmes should be designed taking 
into account a parliamentarians political objectives. The first part of the paper will 
review some issues related to previous work in parliamentary training and argue that 
parliamentary incentives need to be addressed. The Inter-Parliamentary Union’s 
recommendations will be used as an example. The second section of the paper will look 
at the incentives revolving around the political capital which can be gained or lost 
through anti-corruption action. The third section will look at the nature of political 
competition and how this competition affects those incentives. The fourth section will 
address the degree of enforceability of parliamentary work.in areas of representation, 
legislation, executive supervision, and public information).
2 The fifth section will assess 
incentives behind the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s recommendations and the final section 
will summarise concrete actions to be taken by donors to address these incentive 
problems.  
 
There are a number of issues not addressed by this paper for reasons for focus – 
including parliamentary corruption, the nature of parliamentary oversight through audit 
institutions and “eGovernment”, parliamentary relations in developed (OECD) countries, 
case studies and historical analyses falling outside the bounds of the (over)simplified 
political economic analysis used in this paper.
3  The audience for this paper is 
parliamentarians and parliamentary officials in developing countries, as well as their 
                                                 
1 Some examples of such “networks” include the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (PNoWB), 
Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA), the Global Organisation of Parliamentarians Against 
Corruption, and the African Parliamentarians Network Against Corruption (APNAC), among others.  
2 For more on this work in OECD member countries, see the OECD (2001) Report on Parliamentary 
Procedures and Relations (6-11).  
3 Hopkin (1997) notes how party organisation promotes political corruption. For a primer on political 
corruption, see Heywood (1997). For more on legislatures, see Olson (1984).    3
parliamentary colleagues in OECD countries and donor institutions who work with these 
“developing country” parliamentarians.  
Building on Awareness Raising and 
Recommendations  
 
  During the “first wave” of anti-
corruption activity during the 1990s, donor 
sponsored parliamentarian training had a 
particular conception of the State, which deeply 
influenced programme design.
4 Figure 1, a 
representative example of such a view, shows the separate branches of the State. Such a 
view of the State depicts the executive and legislature as two separate entities -- 
responsible for working together as well as balancing each others’ power. Such a view is 
sometimes depicted as pillars of a larger edifice (Ulimwengu, 1995; Stapenhurst and 
Kpundeh, 1995). Such analogies view these “institutions as actors” -- separate, 
sometimes working in co-operation and sometimes working in conflict.
5 To the extent 
that civil society is analysed, it is regarded as a separate actor in contrast to the State and 
as a counter-balance of state power.
6  
 
  These views, while a useful first approximation, have led to recommendations 
such as those shown in Figure 2.
7 As can be seen from the recommendations, the 
legislature is treated as a separate actor from Government, voting legislation, engaging in 
oversight and working (or not) with civil society. Yet, the legislature, in theory at least, 
draws its legitimacy, authority and policy initiatives from “civil society” (Mezey, 1983).  
In practice, legislatures may also rely on patronage in exchange for votes. Legislatures 
are also linked to the executive through the process of ministerial appointment. In 
practice, executives may use legislatures as legitimising institutions for executive 
decisions.
8 The executive may also act along partisan lines (van Aaken, 2003). The 
theory of “balance of power” may (or may not) work for States, but it becomes less 
                                                 
4 For more on the “first wave” of anti-corruption activity, see Michael (2004).  
5 There is some theoretical support for this position, for example see DiMaggio and Powell (1991) or 
March and Olsen (1984). However, even these authors would not take institutions out of their context.  
Given the 1962 publication of Buchanan and Tullock landmark book, the continuing aversion to a political 
capital analysis can only be explained by “depoliticisation” – or the glossing over of politics with 
bureaucratic rhetoric (Ferguson, 1990). 
6 While this view is endemic in the donor community, it also pervades some of the “normal” development 
literature (Hodgkinson and Foley, 2003; Van Til, 2000). Civil society organisations are often 
unrepresentative of the organisations they are supposed to be representing. See Pennings (2000) and 
Christensen et al. (2001) for a more refined view of relations with the executive.  
7 For more information on the recommendations, see http://www.wmd.org/second_assembly/topical/w-
t22.html. Other recommendations exist, see Kasemets (2001).  
8 See Rockman (1984) for an analysis of legislative-executive relations. Darden (2002) notes the important 
role of corruption in helping the state to manage policy and service delivery.     4
useful when applied to institutions. Individuals in these institutions compete for political 
power and will seek resources to obtain political capital.
9 
 





Vote appropriate anti-corruption legislation 
Vote integrity legislation for members of parliaments 
Ensure that appropriate oversight legislation is adopted 
Lobby their governments to sign and/or ratify relevant international instruments 
Promote the passage of freedom of information legislation 
Promote party-funding and electoral campaign legislation that fosters transparency 
 
Oversight 
Reinforce mechanisms within parliament for bringing government to account 
Ensure that the process for preparing and executing the national budget is transparent and provides for 
safeguards against government misuse of public funds and resources 
Promote the creation of watchdog agencies such as the Auditor/Controller General, Ombudsman, etc 
Ensure that the opposition is adequately represented in the parliamentary structures 
Institute transparent and stringent mechanisms for the approval of senior government and public officials 
 
Representation (interaction with civil society) 
Encourage the public to denounce and condemn corruption 
Promote or participate in the promotion of high standards of probity and moral integrity through public 
awareness campaigns 
Source: Adapted from Inter-Parliamentary Union (2001).  
 
  The recommendations in Figure 2 assume parliamentarians are technocrats --
fulfilling their deontological or technocratic duty -- rather than politicians.
 10 Previous 
attempts to ignore the political nature of policy making – to “depoliticise” using 
Ferguson’s (1990) jargon -- .have met with difficulty. For example as Weeks (1970) finds 
in his study of New Zealand that the Ombundsman provides critizens with a new access 
point into the political system for voicing grievances about the public service, but not 
much more. Holmes (1993) finds that anti-corruption campaigns (in the Former Soviet 
context) often served very political purposes. Parliamentarians will generally act if such 
action is in their political interest.
11   
Earning Political Capital with Voter Preferences 
 
                                                 
9 For academic readers, this paper is not presenting a new type of capital along the lines of Putnam’s (1993) 
social capital, Bordieu’s (1986) cultural capital, or human capital (Becker, 1975). See Lopez (2002) for 
more on legislators and political capital.   
10 See Evans (1999) for a discussion of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary institutions. See Liiv (2003) 
for more on the role of the Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament) in restraining of corruption.  
11 Such a statement is a general description and may not apply in all cases, as there are important cases 
where parliamentarians have acted out of moral conviction instead of political expediency. Yet, given the 
“dressing up” of political expediency in moral terms, I am loathe to cite specific examples.    5
Even straying from the “institutions as actors” view, many of the 
recommendations to parliamentarians assume these politicians will “do the right thing” 
and maximise social welfare if given the human capital. In this case “maximise social 
welfare” entails providing the maximum amount of public goods and services (including 
“legislative services” such as high-quality public information on use of state funds). 
Maximising these goods and services necessarily entails minimising the corruption and 
the inefficient redistribution of resources through patronage which can “eat into” these 
goods and services.
12 While there is a positive recognition by donors that their “clients” 
(in this case the parliamentarians) do not do the right thing, they claim that normatively 
they should. If these politicians could be made to understand, or if they could be 
reminded, about what Carney (1998) refers to “an absolute obligation,” then 
parliamentarians would fight corruption. Such an approach could reflect the belief in the 
role of “awareness raising” or could be motivated by diplomacy – as senior officials do 
not go to conferences where they are accused of being corrupt.
13  
 
A first variant of the “do the right thing” approach accepts the existence of 
sometimes prohibitive costs in parliamentarians’ efforts to legislate, oversee, and 
represent “civil society.” In this view, parliamentarians will monitor the executive if their 
information collection costs are less than any gains which can accrue to society. Such a 
view implicitly recognises that parliamentarians have few economic and non-economic 
incentives for monitoring, as parliamentarians generally do not receive more votes or 
cash by looking for executive improprieties. Yet, parliamentarians also receive only 
minor benefits from passing legislation which helps stop administrative corruption.
14  
 
The second variant of the “do the right thing” approach accepts that bribe taking 
and patronage are part of the State and corruption is a part of the political system as 
politicians need funds to campaign and civil servants need bribes to stay at their desks.
15 
This second variant recognises views a trade-off between social welfare and bribe taking 
(or patronage) – namely between majority and minority interests.
16 While such a trade-
off is usually modeled for bureaucrats rather than vote-needing politicians, these officials 
weigh the benefits of collecting bribes with the potential damages inflicted by 
enforcement (Ades and Di Tella, 1997; Benson and Baden, 1985).
17 The (non-incentive 
                                                 
12 Part of the rationale for legislation revolves around the “social good” aspect which makes up for “market 
failure” (Breyer, 1980; Stigler, 1975). 
13 For more on the awareness raising penchant of donors, see Michael (2004). This type of training’s effects 
on “socialisation” is questionable given evidence by Welch and Peters (1997) which finds that political 
variables are more important than others in determining parliamentary attitudes and that a common 
socialisation process is at work within parliaments.  
14 A useful policy implication which has emerged is that costs should be reduced by promoting 
parliamentarian access to information as embodied in international regulations such as the IMF’s Reports 
on the Observance of Standards and Codes (IMF, 2001). In Estonia, Open Society Foundation sponsored a 
programme in collaboration with universities, NGOs and journalists to help lower these transactions costs.  
15 Darden (2002) talks about corruption as promoting state control.  
16 This trade-off has been well-analysed in the literature, see Sigler and Loomis (1998), or Mitchell and 
Munger (1991). 
17 While the formal economic models balance the increased immediate personal monetary gain against a 
risk of detection which can reduce life-time income, the translation from immediate personal monetary gain 
to “funds for campaigns” (mapping dollars into votes) is straight-forward.    6
compatible) policy implication is that parliamentary corruption should be outlawed and 
Ombudsman’s institutions should be established to ensure legislative probity (Pope, 
2000).  
 
  Yet, all these approaches inadequately incorporate the vital role of political 
capital. Parliamentarians are, to some extent, vote maximisers working in these “political 
markets.”
18 In political markets, parliamentarians would want to expose corruption 
because social welfare translates into votes. As the issue of anti-corruption becomes more 
popular, the probability of action turning into votes increases. Pope (2000) notes, “in one 
EU member country, Austria, Freedom Party Jörg Haider ran a successful political 
campaign in 1999, in part on an anti-corruption plank.... Haider doubled the Freedom 
Party's share of the Austrian vote between 1985 and 1999, in part because of his inclusion 
of anti-corruption as a campaign platform.” If anti-corruption increases returns, it can 
also decrease risks of being sacked and perhaps Eduard Shevardnadze’s support for anti-
corruption in Georgia serves as a testament to such a fear (Phillips, 2004). Yet, if serving 
minority interests and engaging in patronage politics earns more political capital, 
parliamentarians would be expected not to follow any type of donor training.  
 
Simply put, parliamentarians, when considering anti-corruption action, will 
balance the probable increase in votes with the costs to special interests which support 
them politically. Figure 3 shows the political capital costs and benefits of anti-corruption 
work for parliamentarians.
19 While the model is an overly simplified representation of the 
choices parliamentarians face, it draws out some of the issues. The upward sloping line 
represents the increase in political capital to parliamentarians as anti-corruption activity 
increases due to favorable voter impressions. The downward sloping line represents the 
loss in political capital as support to anti-corruption activities threatens key 
constituencies. The astute parliamentarian in this simple model will trade off the potential 
sectarian harms with the collective gains to find an optimal level of political capital (Pc*) 
and anti-corruption activity (AC*).  
 
                                                 
18 For an interesting account of the convergence between political capital and regulation (for product 
safety), see High and Coppin. (1999). 
19  See Appendix I for discussion in a slightly more refined framework.    7
Figure 3: Anti-Corruption and Political 












While the recommendations in Figure 2 are ideal recommendations from a 
particular phase of the anti-corruption effort, Figure 4 offers some concrete conditions 
under which the recommendation might be implemented taking the need for 
parliamentarians to earn political capital.  
 
Figure 4: Political Capital Effects of Inter-Parliamentary Union’s 
Recommendations 
 
Recommendation  Helps Political Capital   Hurts Political Capital  Incentive Compatible Donor 
Actions 
Law-making  If majority highly value 
anti-corruption 
 




Offer good PR for “Mr. Clean” 
20 
 
  If perceived 
different/better than 
incumbents 
If supporting legislation 
seen as weak 
Offer alternate funding sources
21 
 
Oversight  Executive is site of 
corruption 
 
If executive can “strike 
back” 
Promote funding of parties and 




  Executive integrity 
issues rather than 
Rely on executive 
patronage for electoral 
Fund equipment needed for 
institutional communication
23 
                                                 
20 Bilateral aid would have little problem given their (sometimes implicit) political mandates. EBRD has a 
political mandate. World Bank has a mandate given recent speeches by Wolfensohn. Implicitly, donors 
already offer such PR by inviting such policymakers to highly visible conferences and writing “best 
practices.”  
21 These funding sources, of course, should not be direct party contributions, but should be based on 
impartial support to groups important for private sector and social sector development. Again, most donors 
already do this implicitly.  
22 Controversially, this is possibly the theory behind the Millennium Challenge Account. In its role as 
hegemon, the US is trying to change incentives for governments (including their parliamentarians).    8
capacity issues  support 
Representation   If active civil society 
will support the MP 
If active civil society 
will not support MP 
 
“Lump” interests groups 
together
24 
  Seen as serving  a 
corruption plagued 
local constituency 
Seen as preaching or 
applying double 
standards 
Fund investigative journalism  
Source: Based on Inter-Parliamentary Union (2001).  
The Effects of Party Competition on Political Capital   
 
Parliamentarians (as politicians) are vote maximisers who operate in a 
competitive environment. Any anti-corruption action should not only increase political 
capital, but it must do so without drawing the potentially damaging ire of parliamentary 
and other State colleagues. In other words, anti-corruption programmes should also be 
designed to so as to increase the parliamentarians’ “competitive advantage” without 
excessively jeopardising them during the process of debating and voting on legislation.   
 
Some authors find that increasing the nature of political competition is enough to 
help reduce corruption. Theoretically, competition for rents generated by corruption 
should reduce these rents to zero (Becker, 1983; Wittman, 1989; Yalcin and Damania, 
2003). The desire to use exposure as a means of furthering the parliamentarian’s personal 
or party objectives can also lessen corruption (Holmes, 1993). Persson et al. (2000) find 
that more competition (as exemplified by larger voting districts and thus lower barriers to 
entry) are associated with less corruption. They also find that where larger shares of 
candidates elected from party lists which have less individual accountability are 
associated with more corruption.
25  
 
However, the evidence is mixed. Hopkin (1997) finds that political competition 
fosters political corruption rather than probity, while Miriam and Chang (2001) find – 
using regression analysis -- that intra-party competition has no affect on “malfeasance.” 
However, they also note the nature of that competition during the period under 
investigation could have been weak. Ades and Di Tello (1999) find that while rents can 
increase corruption, public worries about abuse of these rents would tend to lead to 
foreclosure of these rent-seeking opportunities. If political competition could foster 
corruption, the most likely mechanisms are through collusion between parliamentarians 
and, fearing reprisals, engaging in “mutual forbearance” and even the distribution of 
patronage (Golden and Chang, 2001; Development Strategies (2002).  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
23 Some parliamentarian projects include such funding, but more is needed.  
24 For example, Libecap and Law (2003) find that “Congress did not enact a federal law until 1906 because 
competing producer, bureaucratic, and consumer interests, with different assessments of the benefits of 
federal regulation, prevented the formation of an effective coalition in favor of federal regulation.” The 
lumping together into coalitions is a useful political strategy.  
25 Insiders have even indicated that information from the Parliamentary anti-corruption commission may 
even be opportunely timed to coincide with elections!     9














Green are social returns
The net effect then is that anti-corruption will be adapted only if it promotes the 
“sustainable competitive advantage” of parliamentarians undertaking anti-corruption. 
Figure 5 address the problem with achieving such a sustainable outcome.
26 In the Figure, 
politician A and politician B have an incentive to collude given the chance to do so and 
will both choose the corrupt status quo. Yet, without collusion (and assuming that 
“exposure” can be used as a political strategy), each politician would choose anti-
corruption (exposing the other politician). Yet, if both politicians choose to expose the 
other, they are individually worse off (but society is best off as shown by the social 
welfare pay-offs).  
 
Figure 5 presents a counter-intuitive result as politicians do not line up to expose 
each other. Why is anti-corruption not pursued more vigorous as a political strategy? 
Partly because politicians see before the game is played that they will either individually 
or collectively be worse off. Partly because -- unlike the assumptions of the game -- 
parliamentarians can collude, if implicitly. Thus, if donor activity is to work, it must get 
parliamentarians to “play the game” and Figure 6 lists some of the ways that donors can 
help parliamentarians play the game.  
 
Figure 6: Political Competition Effects of Inter-Parliamentary Union’s 
Recommendations 
 




Incentive Compatible Donor 
Actions 




Indirectly promote political 
competition between parties  
 
                                                 
26 Figure 5 represents a game table giving the options for two politicians and the pay-offs to each. For 
readers not familiar with game tables, see Dixit and Nalebaff (1993).    10
  Existence of an Anti-
Corruption platform 
Fails to live up to 
platform  
Criticism of overly sectarian 
legislation 
 
Oversight  Parliament against the 
executive 
 




monitoring of national 
“independent monitoring” 
 
  Anti-Corruption 
agencies become 





Hard accounting systems 
Representation  Steals votes from 
others’ supporters  
 
Causes nasty feud  External appraisal  




Excess interest group 
influence 
Internal education 
Source: Based on Inter-Parliamentary Union (2001).  
 
Addressing the Legislation-Enforcement Gap 
 
Even if legislative instruments, oversight mechanisms, and representation 
institutions are in place, and even if there is a political settlement, enforcement issues can 
still hamper parliamentarian action on anti-corruption. In the 1980s and 1990s, donors 
worked on legislative and legal assistance, postulating that once laws were in place, 
institutions of enforcement would emerge given the incentive structures of legislation 
(Rapaczynski, 1996).
29 Irregardless of the “quality of such legislation,” experience 
suggests that enforcement was an issue. Figure 7 shows “government effectiveness” for 
several countries in the Caucasus region and Central Asia have low enforcement power 
relative to OECD member governments. Given the non-enforceability of these laws, 





                                                 
27 For more, see Anechiarico and Jocobs (1998).  
28 Faucheaux (2002) notes that interest groups can help a politician with publicity and even fund-raising but 
warns that these interest groups can dominate a parliamentarian candidates’ agenda.   
29 A more stringent view, predominant during economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe, held that 
legislation itself would “spontaneously” emerge in response to incentives. For information on the World 
Bank’s legal and judicial support, see World Bank (2004) and Gupta et al. (2002) provide a favorable 
assessment.  
30 The effectiveness of Western legislative advice is controversial and this paper will not attempt to assess 
this work other than to point the reader to Schauer (2000).    11
Figure 4: Government Effectiveness in the 





































The tradeoff is between liberalism and populism.
31 The social optimum for 
parliamentarians is to pass liberal legislation which forces executive agencies to “catch 
up” with the ideals embodied in the legislation. Prosecution of bribery is one example 
where new institutions of enforcement were developed in OECD countries to deal with 
anti-corruption provisions. In some cases, the optimum is politically attainable if the 
agency responsible for execution is given some power over the targets of regulation.
32 
The parliamentarian’s optimum (given the political capital perspective) is to pass detailed 
legislation according to international “best practice” which is unenforceable.
33 Such 
legislation in the short-term helps the parliamentarian obtain political capital without 
threatening real interests. A variant of the parliamentarian’s optimum consists of applying 
rules that either apply selectively or randomly -- such as spot checks (Beker, 1968; 
Polinsky and Shavell, 2000). Such legislation creates the fear of enforcement without 
being overly “binding.” A parliamentarians pragmatic solution is to pass populist but 
enforceable legislation.
34 Coote (1997) finds that citizens tend to comply with laws not 
only due to fear of enforcement, but also if they are consistent with social norms. 
“Alignment” of legislation with social norms reduces the chances that laws are perceived 
                                                 
31 Unsurprisingly, see Riker (1982) for more. Glaeser and Shleifer. (2003) also find that regulation was less 
vulnerable to subversion by business interests than litigation, thus supporting some form (if even a weak 
form) of liberality.  
32 Law (2003) writes convincingly about the enforcement of the Pure Food and Drug Act, enforcement 
which was only possible due to the licensing powers given to what is now known as the Food and Drug 
Administration.   
33 Many countries’ adherence to the UN Convention Against Corruption represents such a situation, given 
that many under-developed countries do not have the capacity (or even political will) to enforce the 
Convention.  
34 Such legislation may need some help in the form of surveillance from the legislature (Mulgan, 1997). 
The recent debate on Regulatory Impact Assessment in Estonia suggests the “quality of regulation” tends to 
make certain regulations more or less “transparent”, liberal and enforceable” (Kasemets and Liiv 2004). 
7  12
as unjust or irrelevant. Several scholars have asserted that much legislation fits this 
evolutionary profile (Hirschleifer, 1982; Anderson and Hill, 1975).  
 
Figure 8 shows the trade-off between the liberal and populist modes of regulation. 
In a liberal world, where parliamentarians can pass completely enforceable laws, social 
returns rise and thus long-run political capital rises. However, less “unrealistic” anti-
corruption legislation is less enforceable – and thus the line on the graph descends. As for 
enforceability, “populist” anti-corruption regulation promotes political capital as it 
conforms with the pre-existing political preferences of voters.
35 Thus, parliamentarians 
must trade-off their liberal ideals for practicality – and the result should be at a certain 
degree of liberalness (LR*) and political capital (PC*).  
  











  Given this inherent trade-off, liberality can help the parliamentarian if the State 
structures and others are responsive to such policy. Populism would result in more 
political capital, though, if little change can be accomplished in existing institutions. 
Given these constraints, donors should work to ensure that institutions can support a 
liberal vision as much as possible.  
 
Figure 9: Liberal Regulation Effects of Inter-Parliamentary Union’s 
Recommendations 
 
Recommendation  Liberality Helps  Liberality Hurts 
(Enforcement) 
Incentive Compatible Donor Actions 
Law-making  Voters ready for  Change fatigue  Provide liberal models 
                                                 
35 The careful reader will note this effect agrees with Figure 3 such as political capital rises as the level of 
anti-corruption rises. Figure 8 refines this analysis to look at the quality as well as the quantity of anti-
corruption regulation and action. If “liberalness” merely restates social welfare, then Figure 8 is simply a 
restatement of Figure 3.    13
change 
 
  High State capacity  Too much 
democracy
36 
Methods of “parliamentary 
enforcement” 
Oversight  Responsive 
executive  
Other interests in 
society (business?) 
can police executive 
 
Support to other “stakeholders” 




Credibility crisis  Support of vision  
Representation  Educated civil 
society 
 
Fear of parliament  Work on “harmonisation” 
  Active civil society  Credibility Crisis  Teaching non-government orgs to “do 
it yourself” 
Source: Based on Inter-Parliamentary Union (2001).  
 
An Evaluation of Parliamentary Recommendations 
 
The “technical merits” of recommendations like the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s 
are above question – “dictator” establishment of mechanisms based on these 
recommendations would probably decrease corruption. Yet, the political merits of 
executing these recommendations may be questioned. Figure 10 attempts to assess the 
incentive compatibility of each of the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s recommendations on 
average. A simple scale is employed from 1 to 5 where 5 is the most incentive-
compatible and 1 is the least.  
 
For law making, these laws can potentially translate into political capital, thus 
representing the “parliamentarian’s optimum” as discussed above. Enforceability of the 
legislation generally earns low ratings. Political sustainability (the risk of reprisal) is 
relatively low given the general nature of these laws. Finally, the human capital element 




Figure 10: Recommendations from the Inter-Parliamentary Union 
 
Recommendation PC  E  PS  HC 
      
Law-making      
Vote appropriate anti-corruption  legislation  3 1 3 2 
Vote integrity legislation for members of 
parliaments 
3 1 2 2 
                                                 
36 Democracy may collapse due to lack of governability (see Huntington, 1991).   
37 For more on the impact of “the national model,” see Crouch and Streeck (1997) or Coates (2000) for a 
rejoinder.    14
Ensure that appropriate oversight legislation is 
adopted 
2 3 2 4 
Lobby their governments to sign and/or ratify 
relevant international instruments 
3 2 3 1 
Promote the passage of freedom of information 
legislation 
3 3 2 3 
Promote party-funding and electoral campaign 
legislation that fosters transparency 
3 3 1 4 
      
Oversight      
Reinforce mechanisms within parliament for 
bringing government to account 
3 2 3 4 
Ensure that the process for preparing and 
executing the national budget is transparent and 
provides for safeguards against government 
misuse of public funds and resources 
3 4 3 5 
Promote the creation of watchdog agencies 
such as the Auditor/Controller General, 
Ombudsman, etc 
3 4 3 4 
Ensure that the opposition is adequately 
represented in the parliamentary structures 
2 2 2 2 
Institute transparent and stringent mechanisms 
for the approval of senior government and 
public officials 
2 3 3 2 
      
Representation (interaction with civil society)      
Encourage the public to denounce and condemn 
corruption 
2 2 4 2 
Promote or participate in the promotion of high 
standards of probity and moral integrity through 
public awareness campaigns 
3 2 4 2 
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (2001).  
The scale is 1 to 5 with 1 being the lowest. PC represents political capital, E represents possibility of 
enforcement, PS refers to political sustainability given possible reprisals, and HC refers to the “human 
capital” or technical competency needed in parliamentary offices.   
 
 
For over-sight, the scores are more ambiguous. Political capital can be built to the 
extent that the public understands the importance of such oversight. Enforceability is 
possible to the extent that resources are available. Political sustainability is generally low 
given that executives are strong and legislatures weak.
38 Finally human capital generally 
must be quite high – as specialised tasks like auditing require specific skills.   
 
                                                 
38 In this respect, Dewatripont and Roland’s (1995) theory of “divide and conquer” sequencing may be 
valid, as momentum slowly builds for reform.    15
As for representation, political capital can be high if “civil society” believes the 
parliamentarian is credibly representing their interests. The scores are middle range due 
to the credibility problem generally encountered by parliamentarians. Enforceability is 
low as civil society has very little “capacity” of its own – either in the investigative 
journalism sector or elsewhere. Political sustainability poses a risk as civil society can 
highlight perceived policy failures – even if they are successes. Finally, human capital 
can be low as these type of programmes usually involve parliamentary “cheerleading” (or 
moral suasion in slightly more technical language).  
Future Donor Work and Areas to Avoid   
 
Given the simple political economy framework used in this analysis, donor work 
on parliamentary anti-corruption must increase political capital while decreasing the costs 
of acquiring that capital. Formally, it can change institutional incentives so as to promote 
the adoption of the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s recommendations. Figure 11 provides an 
overview of the incentive compatible actions.   
 
Recommendation  Political Capital 
Effects 
Political Competition  Liberal Regulation 




between parties  
 
Provide liberal models 
  Offer alternate funding 
sources 
Criticism of overly 
sectarian legislation 
 
Methods of “parliamentary 
enforcement” 
Oversight  Promote funding of 
parties and countries 








Support to other “stakeholders” 






Support of vision  
Representation   “Lump” interests 
groups together 
 
External appraisal   Work on “harmonisation” 
  Fund investigative 
journalism  
Internal education  Teaching non-governemnt orgs 
to “do it yourself” 
 
 
Given the suggested donor actions, Figure 12 shows the effects of such donor 
action on political capital acquisition costs and benefits. Most of the suggested actions 
reduce the cost of implementing the Union’s recommendations. For example, providing 
parliamentarians with alternative funding sources would reduce the political costs 
associated with alienating pro-corruption constituencies. Promoting education about 
tendering procedures would also, in theory, reduce the work parliamentarians must do to 
educate businesses in their constituencies. Building state capacity can help 
parliamentarians, as Falconer et al. (2001) note, “if public administration has a role to   16
play in supporting parliamentary work it will have to reflect critically on its foundations 
of efficiency, effectiveness and user (client) friendliness - key features of managing in the 
public sector but not necessarily political values.” As unpopular as the advice is being, 
teaching parliamentarians about the advantages of neo-liberal reform could be an 
effective way of reducing corruption under certain circumstances (Gerring et al., 2001). 
Golden (2002) finds that increased competition implicit with “globalisation” sparked 
investigations in Italy indicting corrupt politicians and businesspersons. All of these 
activities would shift the expense curve up thereby increasing political capital for less 
politically risky increases in anti-corruption activity.  
 












Support the vision 
 
 
If donor work can increase the popularity of anti-corruption work done by 
parliamentarians, then both anti-corruption and political capital rise. Examples include 




  Given the possible range of donor activities which may change parliamentary 
political incentives to engage in anti-corruption, a number of risks can be identified. First, 
such work should avoid the appearance that parliament is being “depoliticised” or 
“bureaucratised.” Parliaments are, by design, political entities and any technocratic 
programme will eventually confront politics. Instead, political values must be clearly 
stated and discussed.
40 Second, international organisations should not be allowed to 
                                                 
39 For more on the Convention, see http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_convention_corruption.html.  
40 Lupo (2001) notes that “It consequently highlights the need for Parliaments, in order to be consistent 
with their historical mission of guaranteeing transparency and democratic nature of decision-making 
process, to lay down specific procedures and to adopt new instruments for the purpose of ensuring the 
enhancement of the quality of legislation becoming a political objective. In particular, through the   17
interfere in parliamentarian work. Parliaments are designed to incorporate the political 
values of the country and not to serve the interests of international organisations. Too 
close links with the international organisations may well threaten their perceived 
sovereignty as well as the institution’s legitimacy.
41 Third, donors working closely with 
parliamentarians and parliamentarian networks need to avoid capture. Donor work needs 
to create political incentives. However, political incentives may drive recommendations 
for donor support – leading to projects which are too focused on short-term “awareness 




Simply providing parliamentarians with human capital (though this is really 
information and now knowledge) is insufficient. Parliamentarians must have the proper 
incentive structure and the proper organisations forms. In this paper, we discussed the 
ways that political capital can be fomented, how enforcement compatible legislation can 
be passed, how political sustainability can be achieved.  
 
An important next step in assessing both the impact of parliamentary 
recommendations and the proposed actions in this paper will be to conduct a regulatory 
impact assessment (RIA). The preliminary data from Estonia – as shown in Kasemets 
(2001) shows that these assessments are useful for guiding policy toward legislatures. 
Future work will need to be done to assess parliamentarian incentives as they perceive 
them – highlighting the role of RIAs. The preliminary data from Estonia and other CEE 
countries – as shown in Kasemets (2001) – indicates that these assessments are useful for 
guiding policy toward legislatures. Future work will need to be done to assess 
parliamentarian incentives as they perceive them – highlighting the role of RIA as an 
institutional tool for more transparent and knowledge based policy-making and 
parliamentary debate.   
 
The “first wave” of donor sponsored anti-corruption programmes usefully focused 
on elaborating recommendations for parliamentarians or tried to train them (develop 
human capital) in anti-corruption. Now it time for these programmes to take into account 
parliamentarian incentives to adopt these recommendations and/or use this “knowledge.” 
This paper has discussed these incentives and the ways these programmes should and can 
help build political capital by managing voter demands, political competition, patronage, 




                                                                                                                                                 
rationalisation and simplification of existing regulation and through the evaluation and verification of 
information provided by the executive concerning the effects of the new legislation” (italics ours). 
41 Bork (2003) convincingly argues that the internationalisation of the legislative process is increasingly 
violating the sovereignty and democracy of national institutions.  
42 For a more technical description of problems related to identifying such “public goods,” see Tideman and 
Tullock (1976) for a more formal discussion and  Clark (2000) for a more approachable and fuller 
discussion.    18
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Appendix I: An Alternative Formulation of the Incentive Problem 
 
 
A slightly more refined analysis – but qualitatively similar to the analysis presented in the 
text – would assess the costs and benefits for voting on anti-corruption reform. Assume a 
normal distribution (to expose the issues more clearly) of gains and losses from 
corruption for voters. Further assume the median voter is indifferent as he or she neither 
gains nor loses from corruption. Given these particular assumptions, a status quo bias 
would exist in this system. If transactions costs such as collecting information, exposing 
oneself to the ire of parliamentary colleagues, or risking negative enforcement exist, then 
these transaction costs would need to paid by these tax payers before anti-corruption 




Given this simple view, two types of activities should be undertaken to make anti-
corruption politically incentive compatible. First, costs can be shifted such that the 
median voter experiences a positive gain from anti-corruption. Second, the distribution of 
gains and losses can be shifted such that the median voter is harmed with the same 
transactions costs. Of course, these results ignore a large amount of research such as 
Persson and Tabellini (1999) who find that “groups organised as a lobby have 
disproportionate influence on the final allocation, which generally results in sub-optimal 
allocations.”  For simplicity, this paper will not address coalition models or models with 
minority voting power.  
 
 
 